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Abstract: Peering and transit are two types of Internet interconnection among ISPs.
Peering has been a core concept to sustain Internet industry. However, for the
past several years, many ISPs broke their peering arrangement because of
asymmetric traffic pattern and asymmetric benefit and cost from the peering.
Even though traffic flows are not a good indicator of the relative benefit of an
Internet interconnection between the ISPs, it is needless to say that cost is a
function of traffic and the only thing that we can know for certain is
inbound/outbound traffic volumes between the ISPs. In this context, we suggest
Max {inbound traffic volume, outbound traffic volume} as an alternative
criterion to determine the Internet settlement between ISPs and we demonstrate
this rule makes ISPs easier to make a peering arrangement. In our model, the
traffic volume is a function of a market share. We will show the market share
decides traffic volume, which is based on the settlement between ISPs. As a
result, we address the current interconnection settlement problem with
knowledge of inbound and outbound traffic flows and we develop an analytical
framework to explain the Internet interconnection settlement.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The Internet industry is dynamic. The number of Internet Service
Providers (ISPs) is increasing rapidly and the structure of the industry
changes continuously.  It is widely accepted that today’s Internet industry
has vertical structure: over 40 Internet Backbone Providers (IBPs) including
5 top-tier backbones constitute the upstream industry (Kende, 2000) and
over 10,000 ISPs for accessing the Internet make up the downstream
industry (Weinberg, 2000). A backbone provider service is critical for those
ISPs to connect to the whole Internet. As the number of ISPs and IBPs
increase, the Internet interconnection settlement1 issue is becoming more
significant. Under the current interconnection arrangement, it is uncertain to
decide which (a sender or a receiver) has responsibility for the traffic to send
or receive because current capacity based interconnection pricing scheme
does not know which part has to pay a cost of that traffic. ISPs can use
pricing based on inbound traffic volume, on outbound traffic volume, on a
hybrid of inbound and outbound traffic volume, or on the line capacity
regardless of volume (Hutson, 1998, p565). None of these methods gives full
satisfaction to all of the service providers in the industry. Many scholars and
industry experts say that a usage-based pricing scheme and a usage-based
settlement system are the only alternative to overcome the current
uncertainty. However, they agree that there are technical difficulties in
changing the current Internet financial system to a usage-based system2.
Even though traffic flows are not a good indicator of the relative benefit of
an Internet interconnection between the service providers (Kende, 2000,
p36), it is needless to say that cost is a function of traffic and the only thing
that we can know for certain is inbound/outbound traffic volumes between
the service providers. We address the current interconnection settlement
problem with knowledge of inbound and outbound traffic flows and we
develop an analytical framework to explain the Internet interconnection
settlement issues.
1 Settlment can be thought of as payments or financial transfers between ISPs in return for
interconnection and interoperability (Cawley, 1997)
2 Various kinds of protocols, duplicate layers, packet dropping, dynamic routing, and
reliability issues, etc.
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2. TYPES OF INTERNET INTERCONNECTION
There are two types of Internet interconnection among ISPs and IBPs:
peering and transit. The only difference among theses types is in the
financial rights and obligation that they generate to their customers. First, we
will examine the history of Internet interconnection.
2.1 History of Interconnection
To understand the relationship between peering and transit, it is
necessary to review the situation before the commercialization of the
Internet in 1995. During the early development of the Internet, there was
only one backbone and only one customer, the military, so interconnection
was not an issue. In the 1980s, as the Internet was opened to academic and
research institutions, and the National Science Foundation (NSF) funded the
NSFNET as an Internet backbone. Around that time, the Federal Internet
Exchange (FIX) served as a first point of interconnection between federal
and academic networks. At the time that commercial networks began
appearing, general commercial activity on the Internet was restricted by
Acceptable Use Policy (AUP), which prevented the commercial networks
from exchange traffic with one another using the NSFNET as the backbone.
(Kende, 2000, p5) In the early 1990s, a number of commercial backbone
operators including PSINet, UUNET, and CerfNET established the
Commercial Internet Exchange (CIX) for the purpose of interconnecting
theses backbones and exchanging their end users’ traffic. The NSF decided
to cease to operate the NSF backbone, which was replaced by four Network
Access Points (NAPs) 3. (Minoli and Schmidt, 1998, p28)  The role of NAPs
is similar to that of CIX. After the advent of CIX and NAPs, commercial
backbones developed a system of interconnection known as peering.
2.2 What is peering?
The term “peering” is sometimes used generically to refer to Internet
interconnection with no financial settlement, which is known as “Sender
Keeps All (SKA)” or “Bill and Keep” arrangement. Peering can be divided
into several categories: (1) according to its openness, it can be private
peering or public peering, (2) according to the numbers of peering partners it
can be Bilateral Peering Arrangement (BLPA) or Multilateral Peering
Arrangement (MLPA), and (3) according to the market in which it occurs, it
3 4 NAPs are Chicago NAP (Ameritech), San Francisco NAP (Pacific Bell), New York NAP
(Sprint), and Washington D.C. NAP (Metropolitan Fiber Systems).
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can be primary peering in the backbone market or secondary peering in the
downstream market.
The original 4 NAPs points for public peering. Anyone who is a member
of NAP can exchange traffic based on equal cost sharing. Members pay for
their own router to connect to the NAP plus the connectivity fee charged by
the NAP. As the Internet traffic grew, the NAPs suffered from congestion.
Therefore, direct circuit interconnection between two large IBPs was
introduced, so called bilateral private peering, which takes place at a
mutually agreed place of interconnection. This private peering is opposed to
public peering that takes place at the NAPs. It is estimated that 80 percent of
Internet traffic is exchanged via private peering (Kende, 2000, pp. 6-7).
A peering arrangement is based on equality, that is, ISPs of equal size
would peer. The measures of size could be  (i) geographic coverage, (ii)
network capacity, (iii) traffic volume, (iv) size of customer base, or (v) a
position in the market. The ISPs would peer when they perceive equal
benefit from peering based on their own subjective terms. (Kende, 2000, p8)
The followings are peering characteristics:
(1) Peering partners only exchange traffic that originates with the
customer of one ISP and terminates with the customer of the other peered
ISP. As part of peering arrangement, an ISP would not act as an
intermediary. And it would not accept the traffic of one peering partner for
the purpose of transiting this traffic to another peering partner. This
characteristic is called a “non-transitive relationship.”
(2) Peering partners exchange traffic on a settlement-free basis. The only
cost of each partner is its own equipment and the transmission capacity
needed for the two peers to meet at each peering point
(3) Peering partners generally meet in a number of geographically
dispersed locations. In order to decide where to pass traffic to another, they
have adopted what is known as “hot-potato routing,” where an ISP will pass
traffic to another backbone at the earliest point of exchange.
According to Block (Cukier, 1999), there are two conditions necessary
SKA peering, that is, peering with no settlement, to be viable: (1) The traffic
flows should be roughly balanced between interconnecting networks; and (2)
the cost of terminating traffic should be low in relation to the cost of
measuring and billing for traffic. In sum, peering is sustainable under the
assumption of mutual benefits and costly, unnecessary traffic measuring.
Peering partners would make a peering arrangement if they each perceive
that they have more benefits than costs from the peering arrangement. Most
ISPs historically have not metered traffic flows and accordingly have not
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erected a pricing mechanism based on usage. Unlimited access with a flat
rate is a general form of pricing structure in the Internet industry. Finally,
peering makes billing simple: no metering and no financial settlement.
2.3 What is transit?
Transit is an alternative arrangement between ISPs and IBPs, in which
one pays another to deliver traffic between its customers and the customers
of other provider. The relationship of transit arrangement is hierarchical: a
provider-customer relationship. Unlike a peering relationship, a transit
provider will route traffic from the transit customer to its peering partners.
An IBP with many transit customers has a better position when negotiating a
peering arrangement with other IBPs. Another difference between peering
and transit is existence of Service Level Agreement (SLA). In the peering
arrangement, there is no SLA to guarantee rapid repair of problems. In the
case of an outage, both peering partners may try to repair the problem, but it
is not mandatory. This is one of the reasons peering agreements with the
company short of competent technical staffs are broken.  But in the transit
arrangement it is a contract and customers could ask transit provider to meet
the SLA. In the case of e-commerce companies, they prefer transit to
peering. Since one minute of outage causes lots of losses to them, rapid
recovery is critical to their business. Furthermore, in the case of transit, there
is no threat to quit the relationship while in the case of peering a non-
renewal of the peering agreement is a threat. When purchasing transit
service, ISPs will consider other factors beside low cost:  performance of the
transit provider’s backbone, location of access nodes, number of directly
connected customers, and a market position.
3. ASSUMPTIONS OF THE INTERNET
INTERCONNECTION ECONOMIC MODEL
To simplify the model, we made several assumptions:
(1) There is only one IBP in the upstream backbone market and there
are two ISPs in the downstream Internet access market. ISP-1 and ISP-2 sell
the Internet connectivity to their customers. The interconnection to the IBP’s
network is the only way to do that because the IBP is the sole provider of the
Internet backbone. The IBP does not support customers directly.
(2) If the market share of ISP-1 is α, then that of ISP-2 is (1-α) because
there are only two ISPs in the market (0<α<1). This market share is a unique
factor in determining traffic volume and α is a parameter, which can be
given by the downstream Internet access market.
6 Martin B. Weiss and SeungJae Shin
(3) N is the total number of customers in the downstream Internet access
market. If the market share of ISP-1 is α, the number of Internet subscribers
of ISP-1 is N*α and that of ISP-2 is N*(1-α). Customers do not have to
choose two ISPs at the same time because of homogeneity of the service.
(4) There are three kinds of traffic in each ISP, Tij, where i = 1, 2
(subscript for ISP) and j = L, O, I (subscript for traffic type): local traffic
(T1L, T2L), outbound traffic (T1O, T2O), and inbound traffic (T1I, T2I).
•  Each ISP generates two types of traffic: local traffic which uses only
local network and outbound traffic which uses whole network
including backbone network and the other ISP’s network.
• The amount of local traffic depends on its market share. An ISP with
large market share has a relatively large portion of local traffic
compared to its outbound traffic, while an ISP with small market share
has a relatively small portion of local traffic compared to its outbound
traffic.
•  The amount of outbound traffic depends on the other ISP’s market
share. That is to say, ISP-1’s outbound traffic (T1O) depends on the
market share of ISP-2, (1-α), and vice versa.
•   One ISP’s inbound traffic is the same as the other ISP’s outbound
traffic, which means ISP-1’s inbound traffic (T1I) is the same as ISP-
2’s outbound traffic (T2O) because there are only two ISPs in the
market.
• The assumption of dependency of market share comes from a concept
of network externality4.  An ISP with large customer base and many
Internet resources such as FTP sites and Web sites is less dependent on
other ISPs than an ISP with small customer base and less Internet
resources.
(5) The average traffic generated per subscriber is assumed that 3 G bits
per month, which comes from the following assumptions and calculation:
•  The two ISPs sell only 56 Kbps dial-up modem Internet
connectivity5.
• The average hours of Internet usage is 90 hours per month6.
4 Network externalities arise when the value or utility that a customer derives from a product
or service increases as a function of other customers of the same or compatible products or
services; that is, the more users there are, the more valuable the network. There are two kinds
of network externality in the Internet. One is direct network externality: the more E-mail
users, the more valuable the Internet is. The other is indirect network externality: the more
Internet users there are, the more web contents will be developed, which makes the Internet
even more valuable for its users. (Kende, 2000)
5 According to the report (2001) from USGAO (United States Government Account Office),
87.5% of Internet users use the narrow band dial-up modem.
6 According to the report (2001) from USGAO (United States Government Account Office),
15 ~ 25 hours per week is the most frequently selected Internet usage hours from which we
choose 20 hours per week and converted it to 90 hours per month.
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• We apply 1:6 bandwidth ratio. The bandwidth ratio occurs because a
user does not consume whole 56 Kbps for the duration of the
connection. For example, in the case of reading a news article in the
Internet, a user can use a full capacity of downloading that news
article, but after that, when he reads a news article, no traffic is
transmitted.
• 56 (Kbps) * 90 (hours/month) * 3600 (seconds/hour) * 1/6 = 3 G bits
per subscriber approximately.
(6) The number of subscriber and the average traffic per subscriber
determine the traffic volumes such as T1 and T2.
•  The total traffic generated by ISP-1 (T1) is the sum of local traffic
(T1L) and outbound traffic (T1O): T1 = T1L +T1O = 3 G bits*(Number of
ISP-1’s Subscriber) = 3 G bits *(α*N).
•  The total traffic generated by ISP-2 (T2) is the sum of local traffic
(T2L) and outbound traffic (T2O): T2 = T2L +T2O = 3 G bits *(Number of
ISP-2’s Subscriber) = 3 G bits *(1-α)*N.
(7) The interconnection fee (settlement) is the only cost of each ISP to
IBP. The IBP does not have any cost. This settlement is the only revenue of
the IBP.
(8) Each ISP can get a fixed monthly Internet access charge from its
own users.
The following graph illustrates traffic flow and relationship between IBP
and ISPs.
ISP-1 ISP-2
IBP
T1I=T2O
T2O
T1L
T2L
T2I =T1OT1O
Figure1. Traffic flows
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4. TRAFFIC FUNCTION
Because there are only two ISPs, if one ISP’s market share is 100%, then
all the traffic generated in this market comes from that ISP and therefore no
connection to the backbone is needed. If the market shares of the two ISPs
are the same (α=50%), the traffic from each ISP must be the same, because
the traffic is dependent upon only the market share. The local traffic
increases and the outbound traffic decreases as the market share increases,
but the increasing or decreasing patterns are not linear. This non-linear
characteristic comes from the number of servers on a network. Under the
assumption that each user accesses each server with equal probability,
average traffic is directly proportional to the number of servers on the
network. The local traffic function (fL) is non-linear only if the number of
servers on the network is non-linear with respect to market share (α). One of
the main reasons for non-linear number of servers with respect to market
share (α) is mirroring7 and caching8. The mirroring of servers like duplicate
FTP servers or the caching of Web pages by ISPs, moves applications and
data closer to the Internet users. As the number of subscribers increases, the
mirroring servers and the caching servers increase more than linear, which
means that local traffic also increases in a non-linear fashion. According to
the report by Williams and Sochats (1999), investigating whether the amount
of time Internet applications hold Interstate telecommunication resources is
less than 10% of the total time an Internet user is connected to its local ISP,
mirrored sites continue to expand and caching of Web pages by ISPs even
more widespread, the percentage of time Internet applications will use the
Interstate transmission facilities will continue to decrease. This result implies
that as the number of the mirrored and caching servers increases, the portion
of local traffic within the network increases sharply.
By use of the above concept, we use the quadratic monotonic increasing
function satisfying the following three points in the market share plane (X-
axis) and traffic plane (Y-axis): (0%, 0%), (50%, 50%), and (100%, 100%).
The local traffic function (fL) and outbound traffic function (fo) satisfying the
above conditions are:
2*α2      :  0<α<0.5……………………………………..(1)
fL(α) =
-2*(1-α)2  +1      :0.5<α<1 ……………..……………….(2)
7 Content providers maintain duplicated web sites on a number of different servers to improve
bandwidth efficiency and better service to the end-users.
8 Storing copies of frequently retrieved Web pages or data on servers that are geographically
closer to end-users.
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  1 - 2*α2 :  0<α<0.5 ………………………..…(3)
fO(1-α) = 1- fL(α) =
 -2*(1-α)2  :0.5<α<1 ……………………….…(4)
The following figure shows graphs of local and outbound traffic using
the above functions.
Local vs. Outbound Traffic
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
Market Share
local outbound
Figure2. Proportion of local and outbound traffic
5. TRAFFIC SUPPLY FOR INTERCONNECTION
As we mentioned earlier section, the traffic using ISP-1’s network (T1N)
consists of three types of traffic: (1) Local traffic only using ISP-1’s network
(T1L), (2) outbound traffic generated by ISP-1 and forwarding to ISP-2’s
network (T1O), and (3) inbound traffic generated by ISP-2 and coming into
ISP-1’s network (T1I). For the traffic using ISP-1’s network and ISP-2’s
network, we can write the following equations:
T1N = T1L  + T1O  + T1I   …………………………….……………….(5)
 T2N = T2L  + T2O  + T2I   ……………………………………………..(6)
One ISP’s outbound traffic is the same as the other ISP’s inbound traffic.
Therefore we can change equations (5) & (6) into equations (7) & (8):
T1N = T1L  + T1O  + T2O   …….………….…………………………….(7)
 T2N = T2L  + T2O  + T1O   ………………………………………………(8)
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According to equations (7) & (8), the traffic of one ISP’s network is the
sum of its local traffic and total outbound traffic (T1O + T2O).  The line
capacity between ISP and IBP should be at least the sum of each ISP’s
outbound traffic, which can be traffic supply in this model. We assume that
the IBP has enough capacity to accommodate ISPs’ traffic in the
downstream market.
6. MAXIMUM OUTBOUND TRAFFIC CRITERION
FOR SETTLEMENT AND TRAFFIC DEMAND
These days, 80%-85% of all ISP traffic is traffic generated by receiver
requests, such as Web page retrieval or downloading files (Hutson, 1998,
p571). In these cases, the request traffic is generally very small compared to
the traffic of web pages or downloaded files. That means there is much more
inbound traffic compared to the outbound traffic for each service request.
This is a typical asymmetric traffic flow pattern between inbound and
outbound traffic.
The peering arrangement is based upon the symmetric traffic pattern.
However, service oriented Internet providers such as Web hosting providers
(web farm) produce more outbound traffic than the providers with a large
customer base. Peering is basically SKA settlement system. Refusing a
peering arrangement means that the refused partner has to pay the transit fee
for interconnection service. The inbound and outbound traffic volumes are
not a good indicator to determine Internet connectivity fees because we do
not know well who can get more benefit and who uses more the other’s
network precisely. There is an uncertainty in matching benefit and cost of
network usage. However, in reality, the knowledge of inbound and outbound
traffic volumes is the only available information between ISPs’ networks.
Regardless of the type of service provider and the customer size of ISP,
when an ISP connects to a backbone provider, Max {inbound traffic
volume, outbound traffic volume} can be an alternative criterion to
determine the interconnection fee between the two providers.
In the case of interconnection between ISP-1 and IBP, Max {inbound
traffic volume, outbound traffic volume} can be rewritten as,
Max {T1O, T1I}
=    Max {T1O, T2O}
=    Max  {fO(α)*T1,   fO(1-α)*T2}
=    Max  {(1- fL(α))*T1,  (1- fL(1-α))*T2}
=    Max  {(1- fL(α))*α*3G bits*N,  (1- fL(1-α))*(1-α)*3G bits*N}
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          (-2α3 +α) * 3G bits *N, when 0 < α < 0.5 ………………………(9)
=
           2*(1-α)3 * 3G bits*N, when 0.5 < α < 1………………………(10)
The equations (9) & (10) consist of two parts: deterministic terms (3 G
bits *N) and variable terms that can be varied by the value of market share
(α). The following table and graph are made by the only variable part of the
equations (9) and (10) when a market share of ISP-1 (α) increases from 0%
to 100%.
Market Share Local Traffic Outbound Traffic Inbound Traffic Max
ISP-1 ISP-2 ISP-1 ISP-2 ISP-1 ISP-2 ISP-1 ISP-2 {T1O, T2O}
α (1 - α) T1L T2L T1O T2O T1I T2I
0.00 1.00 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.10 0.90 0.020 0.980 0.980 0.020 0.020 0.980 0.098
0.20 0.80 0.080 0.920 0.920 0.080 0.080 0.920 0.184
0.30 0.70 0.180 0.820 0.820 0.180 0.180 0.820 0.246
0.40 0.60 0.320 0.680 0.680 0.320 0.320 0.680 0.272
0.50 0.50 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.250
0.60 0.40 0.680 0.320 0.320 0.680 0.680 0.320 0.272
0.70 0.30 0.820 0.180 0.180 0.820 0.820 0.180 0.246
0.80 0.20 0.920 0.080 0.080 0.920 0.920 0.080 0.184
0.90 0.10 0.980 0.020 0.020 0.980 0.980 0.020 0.098
1.00 0.00 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Table 1. Max {{T1O, T2O}
Figure 3. Max {T1O, T2O}
Max (T1o, T 2o}
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0.100
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The maximum outbound traffic of the ISP-1 and ISP-2 can be the traffic
demand for each ISP to determine settlement in this model.
• Traffic Demand (α) = Max {T1O, T2O}
From the above table and graph, we can draw the conclusion that the
traffic demand for interconnection with the backbone provider depends on
the market share α. And this demand is symmetric at 50%. The following
table shows the traffic demand per month according to the market share α.
Market
Share α
0.1/ 0.9 0.2 / 0.8 0.3 / 0.7 0.4 / 0.6 0.5
Traffic
Demand
294Mbits*N
(=3G*0.098)
552Mbits *N
(=3G*0.184)
738Mbits *N
(=3G*0.246)
816Mbits *N
(=3G*0.272)
750Mbits N
(=3G*0.250)
Table 2. Traffic Demand
The number of bits that can be accommodated by a single T-1 line in a
month is 432,000 M bits per month9, which is calculated by the assumption
of 4 peak hours a day.  We can know how many T-1 lines are needed if we
divide traffic demand per month by 432, 000 M bits. The following table
shows the number of T-1 lines needed for traffic demand under the
assumption of N = 5,000 users. For example, in the case of α = 0.1, {294 M
bits * 5,000}/ 432,000 M bits = 3.4 T-1 lines.
Market Share ( α) 0.1 / 0.9 0.2 / 0.8 0.3 / 0.7 0.4 / 0.6 0.5
Number of T-1s 4 7 9 10 9
Table 3. Number of T-1s needed for Traffic Demand
The settlement is generally defined as a product of the traffic demand and
the interconnection fee. In this case, the settlement can be expressed as a
product of (Number of T-1 lines) and (T-1 transit price). For example, if the
ISP-1 uses 4 T-1 lines and the Internet interconnection T-1 transit price is
$1,000 per month, then the settlement is $4,000 per month. The transit price
is usually determined by the provider’s relative strength and level of
investment in a particular area (Halabi, 2000, 42p). It is certain that T-1
transit prices have decreased continuously. In 1996, the Internet connectivity
for T-1 was $3,000 per month with $1000 setup fee (Halabi, 1997, 40p).
According to Martin (2001), the average price of a T-1 connection has
continuously decreased for several years: $1,729 (1999), $1,348  (2000), and
$1,228 (2001).
9 1.5 M bps * (3600 second * 4 peak hours * 30 days)
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We assume that the T-1 transit price is given by the market, which is
equal to $1,000 per month. The following table shows the amount of
settlement payment from each ISP to the IBP. This settlement is also
symmetric at the mid point of α= 0.5.
Market Share 0.1/0.9 0.2/0.8 0.3/0.7 0.4/0.6 0.5
Settlement $4,000 $7,000 $9,000 $10,000 $9,000
Table 4. Settlement from ISP to IBP
7. INTERNET ACCESS USER PRICE AND
PEERING INCENTIVE
If we assume that each customer pays the fixed price per month for his
accessing the Internet, by use of the cost and revenue function we can
calculate how much a user price should be.
The following shows the procedure of calculation of user price P1 and P2
of ISP-1 and ISP-2 under the assumption of ISP-1’s market share 0 < α <
0.5.
• Revenue of ISP-1   = P1 * (Number of Subscribers)
                                  =  P1 * (α*5,000)  .………………………….(11)
• Cost of ISP-1     = (Settlement to IBP)
                               = (No. of T-1 lines)*(T-1 transit price)
                                  = (No. of T-1 lines)* $1,000..……....…….…(12)
• Profit of ISP-1      = (11) – (12)
                         =  P1*(α*5,000) -  (No. of T-1 lines)* $1,000
                         =  1,000*{5*P1*α – No. of T-1 lines}….…...(13)
• Equation (15) should be greater than ‘0’.
• User Price P1    > (No. of T-1)/(5*α) ……………………...……(14)
The same logic is applied to ISP-2.
• Revenue of ISP-2   = P2 * (Number of Subscribers)
                                  =  P2 * ((1-α)*5,000)   ……………….……(15)
• Cost of ISP-2     = (Settlement to IBP)
                                       = (No. of T-1 lines)*(T-1 transit price)
                                   = (No. of T-1 lines)* $1,000 ….……..…....(16)
• Profit of ISP-2       = (15) – (16)
                              =  P2*((1-α)*5,000) - (No. of T-1 lines)* $1,000
                                      =  1000*{P2*(1-α)*5 - (No. of T-1 lines)}...(17)
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• Equation (17) should be greater than ‘0’.
• User Price (P2)      > (No. of T-1)/(5*(1-α)) ..……………….…(18)
From the equation (14) and (18) we can calculate the breakeven user
price P1 and P2 for ISP-1 and ISP-2 to survive in the downstream market.
The following table shows the user prices P1 and P2 according to the change
of market share α from 0.1 to 0.9.
Table 5. Breakeven User Price of ISPs
If the Internet access market user price is set to $2.5 per month, then we
can divide two regions according to the market share. In the region of (0.3 <
α < 0.7), both ISP-1 and ISP-2 will make a negative profit. Therefore, both ISPs
have an incentive to make a peering arrangement. However, in the other region like
(α < 0.3 or α > 0.7), the ISP with a larger market share has a positive profit and does
not want to make a peering arrangement with the ISP with a smaller market share.
This implies equality characteristic of peering. The following table shows each ISP’s
dominant strategy according to its market share.
ISP-1 ISP-2
α 1 - α
ISP-1’s
dominant Strategy
ISP-2’s
dominant Strategy
0.1 0.9 Peering Transit
0.2 0.8 Peering Transit
0.3 0.7 Peering Peering
0.4 0.6 Peering      Peering
0.5 0.5 Peering Peering
ISP-1 ISP-2 ISP-1 ISP-2 IBP ISP-1 ISP-2
α 1-α T-1s Settlement T-1s Settlement Revenue
Breakeven
 P1
Breakeven
 P2
0.1 0.9 4 $4,000 4 $4,000 $8,000 $8 $0.89
0.2 0.8 7 $7,000 7 $7,000 $14,000 $7 $1.75
0.3 0.7 9 $9,000 9 $9,000 $18,000 $6 $2.57
0.4 0.6 10 $10,000 10 $10,000 $20,000 $5 $3.33
0.5 0.5 9 $9,000 9 $9,000 $18,000 $3.6 $3.6
0.6 0.4 10 $10,000 10 $10,000 $20,000 $3.33 $5
0.7 0.3 9 $9,000 9 $9,000 $18,000 $2.57 $6
0.8 0.2 7 $7,000 7 $7,000 $14,000 $1.75 $7
0.9 0.1 4 $4,000 4 $4,000 $8,000 $0.89 $8
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0.6 0.4 Peering Peering
0.7 0.3 Peering Peering
0.8 0.2 Transit Peering
0.9 0.1 Transit Peering
Table 6. ISP’s Dominant Interconnection Strategy
In the peering arrangement, two ISPs can avoid expensive settlement
payment to the IBP through bypassing an IBP’s network and they can lease
communication lines from bandwidth market to connect each other. The cost
of the leased line can be divided by equally between two ISPs. They also
know each other’s inbound and outbound traffic volumes, because one ISP’s
inbound (outbound) traffic is the other ISP’s outbound (inbound) traffic.
Therefore Max {T1O, T2O} criterion can also be applied in this case and there
should be no settlement with each other. The only cost in this case is a half
of the leased line to connect each ISP. The following graph shows
relationship under the peering arrangement.
ISP-1 ISP-2
IBP
T2O
T1L
T2L
T1O
Figure 4. Traffic  under Peering Arrangement
To make a peering arrangement efficient, the cost of peering should be
less than the lowest payment of settlement to the IBP. The minimum
settlement from each ISP to the IBP in the region of (0.3 < α < 0.7) is $9,000
per month. The half of the price of the leased line from the peering
arrangement should be less than $9,000 for the establishment of peering
agreement.
For example, in the case of local peering, one T-1 lease line is assumed to
be $300 per month10, i.e., the half of monthly price of 10 T-1 lines is $1,500,
10 www.bandwidthmarket.com (Pittsburgh local price, Jan. 2002) T-1($294)
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which is far lower than the minimum settlement to the IBP.  If we assume
ISPs are located at east and west coast and they use T3 line instead of 10 T-1
lines to connect each other, the monthly lease price of T-3 line11 is $6,000,
the half of which is also lower than $9000.
8. NEGOTIATION
If the two ISPs make a peering agreement, the revenue of the IBP is ‘0’.
Because any amount of settlement is better than ‘0’, the IBP wants to try to
negotiate with each IBP to lower settlement payment. There are two reasons
for the IBP to make a negotiation with the two ISPs:
(1) If one of ISPs can not survive in the market, the relationship between
upstream market and downstream market changes from (1-IBP vs. 2-ISPs) to
(1-IBP vs. 1-ISP). In the monopoly-monopsony relationship, the IBP’s
negotiation power will reduce, that is not desirable to the IBP.
(2) Expensive settlement makes the ISPs to raise their user access price,
which can lead some of users out of market. If the number of users N
decrease, outgoing traffic also decrease because outgoing traffic is
dependent on the other ISP’s market share. Finally the total market size may
shrink and revenues of the IBP also shrink, that is also not desirable to the
IBP.
9. APPLYING THIS MODEL TO THE REALITY
If we apply this model to the backbone market, the IBP in this model can
be one of the top tiered IBPs12 with a nationwide backbone network and ISP-
1 and ISP-2 can be the second tiered IBPs which need Internet connectivity
to those top tiered IBPs. In 1997, starting with UUNET, top tiered backbone
providers announced not to peer with smaller backbone providers and
content specialized backbone providers. (Kende, 2000) Five top tiered
Internet backbone providers control nearly 80% of the Internet backbone
(Weinberg, 2000), which means the Big Five’s market power is enough to
control over the whole Internet backbone market.  The peering arrangement
                                                                       
11 www.bandwidthmarket.com (LA – NYC, Jan. 2002), T-1($725), T-3($6,044)
12 According to Michael Kende’s Digital Handshake, top tiered IBPs are Worldcom
(UUNET), AT&T, Cable and Wireless, Genuity, and PSINet. According to Neil Weinberg’s
Backbone Bullies, top tiered IBPs are Worldcom, Genuity, AT&T, Sprint, and Cable and
Wireless.
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has been set among the Big Five, but everyone else must pay the price for
passing traffic over Big Five’s networks, which means the rest of IBPs have
to make a transit agreement with Big Five. Because the terms and conditions
of the peering agreement are usually not open, called ‘Non Disclosure
Agreement’ and the other alternative to connect to the Internet is through
Public Network Access Points (NAPs), which have been suffered by
congestion. In reality, the bargaining power of Big Five would be greater
than expected. According to the number of backbone providers, the market
could be classified as a competitive market, but according to the Big Five’s
behaviors, the market could be closer to oligopoly. Their settlement decision
is only based on the line capacity between two backbone providers
regardless of traffic volume. If the industry uses the maximum {inbound
traffic volume, outbound traffic volume}, it would be more effective and
efficient to motivate peering arrangement with smaller backbone providers.
If the second tiered backbone providers made a multilateral private peering
arrangement, it could make an equal power to the Big Five. Finally, the
market will go toward more competitiveness.
10. CONCLUSION
Even though this economic model has many assumptions for
simplification, this model gives us significant results.
(1) The max {inbound traffic volume, outbound traffic volume} criterion
has closer to the usage based pricing system than line capacity pricing,
which gives easier way for peering each other because of symmetric
characteristic.
(2) By use of this criterion, ISPs with small market share have more
difficult to survive in the downstream network access market than ISPs with
large market share because of relatively expensive settlement.
(3) Peering (bilateral or multilateral) is an alternative to avoid expensive
settlement to the IBP and peering gives ISPs a negotiation power against the
IBPs.
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